In this paper we will demonstrate the need for a more cultural understanding of discourses on tech nology and its implications, primarily through an evaluation of existing theories about environmen tal and social risks. A critique of Ulrich Beck's Risk Society (Beck 1992a) provides the major foil for our inquiry. Our thesis is supported by a sec ondary line of argument which gives consideration to Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky's (1982) equally influential thesis on Risk and Culture. We demonstrate that because neither work gives any real autonomy to culture, both run into intractable problems. In Beck's case the fundamental problem is the timing of risk awareness, in Douglas and Wildavsky's its social distribution. Attempts to resolve these problems lead both theories of risk society into self-contradictory and ad hoc theorising. In contradistinction to these theses we sketch out the contours of a late-Durkheimian position drawing upon an earlier empirical investigation of dis course about the computer between 1945 and 1975 (Alexander 1993) and a study of Durkheimian the mes in discourses about natural hazards, environ mental risks and their social consequences (West and Smith 1996a, 1996b). We suggest that a model which acknowledges the autonomy of culture and the role of the mythological, the sacred and the profane in technological discourses enables a more
Can there be a truly rational discourse on scientific technology and risk? Research in the sociology of science suggests not. Ethnographic work tells us that scientific studies are indexical and driven by rule-of-thumb routine practices (Latour and Woolgar 1979, Garfinkel et al 1981). Studies of scientific writing point to the presence of rhetoric and imag ery in the scientific research paper (Gusfield 1976 ). The strong program in the history of science sug gests that scientific knowledge is a tribal artifact that can be studied through the same relativising prism as the Azande oracle (Bloor 1976 ). Such dis cussions of circularity and self-referentiality in sci ence have replaced the image of the rational truth finding engine. What is true for scientific work, moreover, is also true for scientific organization. The recent work of Knorr-Cetina (1994), for exam ple, suggests that "operative fictions" provide the normative foundations for scientific collaboration and research activity within particular institutional settings. It would seem, then, that the social sciences know a good deal about the impact of subjective and cul tural factors upon natural scientific action and ideas. In comparison, we know relatively little about the role that culture and agency play in structuring social scientific and popular discourses about science and technology. Exploring this ne glected area is vital, for it is human beings acting in 1 reference to cultural structures who mark out ap propriate and inappropriate technologies, legiti mate and illegitimate uses of science, and the risks involved in the experimentation and application of technology to society. Symbolic action also defines the possibilities for challenging dominant uses of technology in turn.
In this paper we will demonstrate the need for a more cultural understanding of discourses on tech nology and its implications, primarily through an evaluation of existing theories about environmen tal and social risks. A critique of Ulrich Beck's Risk Society (Beck 1992a) provides the major foil for our inquiry. Our thesis is supported by a sec ondary line of argument which gives consideration to Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky's (1982) equally influential thesis on Risk and Culture. We demonstrate that because neither work gives any real autonomy to culture, both run into intractable problems. In Beck's case the fundamental problem is the timing of risk awareness, in Douglas and Wildavsky's its social distribution. Attempts to resolve these problems lead both theories of risk society into self-contradictory and ad hoc theorising. In contradistinction to these theses we sketch out the contours of a late-Durkheimian position drawing upon an earlier empirical investigation of dis course about the computer between 1945 and 1975 (Alexander 1993 ) and a study of Durkheimian the mes in discourses about natural hazards, environ mental risks and their social consequences Smith 1996a, 1996b) . We suggest that a model which acknowledges the autonomy of culture and the role of the mythological, the sacred and the profane in technological discourses enables a more satisfactory understanding of the social dynamics of risk consciouness and, indeed, Beck's Risk Soci ety text itself.
Permanent Reduction: Technology in Social Theory
While recognizing that modernity may allow some residual belief systems to remain in place, students of contemporary society have argued that technol ogy is by its very nature a rationalizing, instrumen tal, and corrosive force. As an antidote to this failure, Knorr-Cetina urges social scientists to study the role that "modes of fiction" play in contemporary institutional life, describing them as "ways of enchantment of the world" (ibid, p. 5). While her argu ment points directly to the approach we take up here, it is limited by her insistence that micro-analysis of local prac tices is the only plausible entree for studying how and where such enchanting fictions work. In this way, she sepa rates herself from the traditions of inquiry that focus on how codes and narratives operate in a macro-sociological way. Indeed, to a degree unknown in tradi tional industrial production, social life in advanced capitalist society is increasingly organized around the goal of controlling the distribution and conse quences of these pollutants and their associated risks rather than around the production and con sumption of goods themselves. Because contem porary industrial production is forced to continu ally scrutinize its own "rationally constructed" rather than "natural" foundations, we are living in a new stage of reflexive modernization that de mands the heightened exercise of rational dis course and humanitarian control. At the present time, however, private property and profit contin-ue to control economic decision-making in indus trial society. For this reason, the "risk society" in its nascent stage actually threatens the authority of scientific rationality and the faith in human pro gress upon which the exercise of such rationality depends. While expert systems proliferate in an ef fort to evaluate environmental risks, the dearth of scientific data makes firm predictions impossible, and, even if such data were forthcoming, the lack of political-economic democracy makes "accept able" levels of risk impossible to decide. In re sponse to these failures, political activity is begin ning to expand its scope beyond class, party poli tics, and charismatic leaders, embracing global is sues that affect every level of society and demand ing the expansion of democratic control beyond the polity into the worlds of industrial production and scientific expertise.
In this strain of his argument, then, Beck presents the terrors of the risk society as an objective social fact, one that has resulted from intra-systemic, in voluntary, tendendial developments in the eco nomic infrastructure of capitalist societies. They emerge "from techno-economic development it self" (1992a, p. 19), unmediated by broader cultur al frames. The questions of when, and how, a "risk" is detected, and of how these risks are placed on the social agenda, are not raised. It is simply the sheer objective enormity of risk that creates its apperception. Beck makes statements like the following. What language? Who "joins" the horror? Why do people care? These complex issues of interpreta tion and meaning are swept under the carpet by the objectivist fallacy.
Beck II: Time-Lag and Residual Categories
While Beck's determination to proceed in an en tirely objectivist fashion is clear, there are nag ging empirical difficulties that force him to con front the perceptual issue in a less simplistic if not less simplifying way. These center on the question, "why now rather than before?" After all, the objective risks from techno-industrial production did not burst on the scene with the emergence of green politics. During the first part of this century, for example, smog conditions were common in coal-burning cities. What Lon doners called "pea-souper" conditions were re sponsible for thousands of respiratory system re lated deaths. Beck is implicitly aware of this time-lag between objective risk and the percep tion of risk. One can find in his discussion three different empirical explanations for this lag. In each case, however, both the causes postulated and the solutions offered circle back to the kind of simplifying and reductionist understanding of perception we have described above.
(1) "The distribution of socially produced wealth and related conflicts occupy the foreground so long as obvious material need, the 'dictatorship of scarcity', rules the thought and action of people" (ibid., p. 20). In the earlier phase of industrial soci ety, poverty was so great that people were preoccu pied with wealth creation rather than the ecologi cal consequences of its production. Only after min imal levels of wealth have been attained has it been possible for attention to be focussed on risks.
This explanation of time-lag rests on the unex plored assumption that material comfort "natural ly" and "automatically" takes precedence over bi ological health and environmental comfort. Is this an objective human preference structure unmedi ated by broader cultural perceptions? And how much comfort is enough? This explanation as-sumes, moreover, that once wealth has been at tained the perception of risk operates in a socially unmediated way.
(2) "Hazards in those days assaulted the nose or the eyes and were thus perceptible to the senses, while the risks of civilization today typically escape perception and are localized in the sphere of physi cal and chemical formulas (e.g., toxins in food stuffs or the nuclear threat)" (ibid., p. 21). Here Beck confronts the time-lag in a different way, seeking to explain why, even now, the enormity of the risks he has postulated often do not register as strongly as he thinks they should in the perceptions of contemporary populations. self. This representation of nature was itself root ed in a Christian tradition that saw "man" as hav ing dominion over the flora and fauna of the natu ral world. Nonetheless, from its very beginnings industrial society was confronted by an inversion ary discourse, one that polluted technology as a threatening apocalypse. This anti-salvation strand of technological discourse -which emerged on both the political left and right -was deeply con nected, in turn, with an increasingly elaborate ro mantic ideology that defined nature as pacific and innocent, indeed as the last best hope for the sur vival of civilization itself. In the history of industrial society this antipodal strand of technological discourse, while subordi nate to the salvationary strand, was not without significant social effect. Wiener (1981) has demon strated, for example, that in England the "cult of the countryside" powerfully inhibited early enthu siasm for industrialism, and may eventually have contributed to the decline of Britain's economic might. In Germany, as Mosse (1964) has shown, ro mantically inspired Volk ideologies fuelled the powerful antagonisms to modernity that facilitated the emergence of Nazism as a revolutionary alter native to the supposed emptiness of capitalist mo dernity. In France (Tucker forthcoming), this counter discourse informed the syndicalist move ment that presented such a massively popular al ternative to industrial society -both in its capitalist and socialist forms -between 1880 and 1920. In the United States, the "myth of virgin land" (Smith 1950 ) provided the motivational energy for west ward expansion and empire in the nineteenth cen tury, and in the twentieth it inspired the social movement that fought to preserve vast areas of na ture in national parks. Richard Grove (1995) has argued that contemporary environmental con-sciousness is shot through with Judeo-Christian themes. He points out that an "Edenic island dis course", rooted especially in Calvinism, has influ enced the assessment of human impacts upon na ture since the 15th century, and continues to do so today. But for the past several centuries the strand of dis course that Grove and others have identified has been subordinated. It has only been in the late twentieth century that the balance between the so cial referents of the sacred and profane elements of technological discourse has begun to change in contemporary liberal democracies. The devastat ing effects of fifty years of techno-war has etched itself deeply upon contemporary consciousness (Fussell 1975 , Gibson 1986 The historical dynamic of millenial religions emerged from the tension generated by the strug gle between sacred and profane. Beck's account, like other narratives of secular social salvation, is structured in the same way. On the one hand, the language he uses to describe the immense transformatory forces recalls the figures Old Testament prophets employed to foretell the impending de struction that a jealous God would wreck on their morally polluted land. Decrying "the slave morali ty of civilization" (ibid., p. 33), Beck foresees a "maelstrom of hazards" (ibid., p. 37) that will make "the Earth uninhabitable" (ibid., p. 38). "Ca tastrophes" (ibid., pp. 24, 28, 29) will occur, and they will cause "irreversible harm" (ibid., p. 23). We are in "the final and eternal autumn" (ibid., p. 31) of history. Yet, just as the historical linearity of the millenial religious narrative proferred on hu mans the paradoxical ability to exercise their agen cy and reform, Beck is careful to describe impend ing environmental disaster as an imminent and ter rifying threat, but not necessarily an historical in evitability. Behind the backs of the agents of mod ernization, he dialectically suggests, the disasters of risk society and the modernizers' self-interested attempts to ameliorate them may actually be pre paring the path for radical transformation of a pos itive kind. "Determinations of risks," Beck avers (ibid., p. 28, original italics), "are the form in which ethics, and with it also philosophy, culture and pol itics, is resurrected inside the centers of modern ization -in business, the natural sciences and the technical disciplines." The increasingly intense, fear-driven efforts to determine possible risks are producing "an unwanted means of democratiza tion in the fields of industrial production and man agement, which somehow does become public dis cussion" (ibid.). For Marx, the very egoism and im personality of capitalism, its lack of concern for any and all human particularities, had the unfore seen effect of breaking down the barriers of local ism, thus paving the way for cosmopolitanism and solidarity on an unprecedented, international scale. Risk societies are described as operating in the same way. They "contain within themselves a grass-roots developmental dynamics that destroys boundaries" (ibid., p. 47). "Thus it is also and espe cially in denial and non-perception," In this fear-inspired, solidary, and international op position that arises in opposition to the terror of the risk society there emerges the possibility for a new kind of utopia.
"Whereas the utopia of equality contains a wealth of sub stantial and positive goals of social change, the utopia of the risk society remains peculiarly negative and defensive. Basically, one is no longer concerned with attaining some thing "good," but rather with preventing the worst: self limitation is the goal which emerges. The dream of class society is that everyone wants and ought to have a share of the pie. The utopia of the risk society is that everyone should be spared from poisoning." (Ibid. 
